This paper provides an empirical study of bond prices reactions following a repudiation. Based on an original database, it analyses the repudiation by the Soviets of bonds issued under the Tsarist regime. For the two years following the repudiation two striking feature of a representative Tsarist bond traded in Paris must be highlighted: first, the price decline following the repudiation announcement is limited; second the price remains relatively high, and even increases, during the two following years. This is the so-called Soviet Repudiation Puzzle. We argue that the bonds' persistent high relative value can be approached via the Peso problem hypothesis: prices are affected by expected events that never took place and thus remained unobservable. In the Russian case, several unusual events could be expected: a dramatic change in the Russian attitude, due for instance to the Soviet overthrow or a takeover of part of the debt either by the French or by another government (most likely countries created from the former Russian Empire). In this respect, the Soviet Repudiation Puzzle appears as a multidimensional peso problem.
Introduction
On February 8, 1918, a rumor feared by investors becomes reality: an official Soviet decree repudiates all bonds issued by the Tsarist government. As a consequence, one would expect bond prices to drop dramatically and remain close to zero. Surprisingly, they exhibit a very different pattern. The day following the repudiation, a representative Russian bond, floated on the Paris stock exchange 1 in 1906, is still traded at 55% of its par value. Furthermore, the following week, the bond loses a mere 2,73% of its value. Eventually, from this date up to end 1919, the bond price remains higher than 45% and even more striking, almost two years later, on October 21, 1919, it increases to 62,5% of its par value. These extremely puzzling facts are referred to as the "Soviet Repudiation Puzzle" (SRP).
In order to solve the SRP, this paper analyses the price evolution of a representative Tsarist bond during the two years following the repudiation (1918) (1919) . Several possible clues are examined involving all events or news that could affect the perception that the bond would be at least partially repaid. Most interestingly, this leads to consider the impact of several rare events: the repudiation of a foreign bond, the dismemberment of an empire leading to the creation of new countries, a civil war and a world war (WWI) . Before the empirical analysis and in order to see the problem in its true perspective, the sovereign debt issues, the impact on bond prices of rare events and the financial repercussions of the Soviet repudiation are briefly discussed hereafter.
In a survey on sovereign debt emphasizing the theoretical motivations to repay, Eaton and Fernandez (1995) put forward the importance of reputation, punishments, rewards and renegotiation. Eichengreen (1989) and Lindert and Morton (1989) analyze the long-term impact of defaulting and find that defaulting in the 1930's had no impact regarding credit terms in the 1970's. However, according to Özler (1993) , "the spreads on rescheduled loans are more than twice those on new loans during the 1978-80 period". Claessens and Pennachi (1996) and Ureche-Rangau (2002) determine to which extent market prices provide an information regarding the probability of default on sovereign bonds.
Few researchers have analyzed bond prices after a debt repudiation. Up to the XIX th century, repudiations are a rather common event and as stated by Wells and Wills (2000) "history is replete with examples of sovereigns reneging on their debts". During the French revolution, in 1797, in the framework of an operation later called Banqueroute des deux-tiers, the Directoire reduced public debt by two third by exchanging existing bonds for almost valueless ones (Aftalion (1996) ). However, in order to avoid commercial retaliations, governments were usually reluctant to repudiate international debts. This explains why, before 1917, only a very limited number of countries had repudiated their foreign debt (Borchard (1951) ). The French market had to cope, in 1834, with the Dona Maria government repudiation of Portuguese bonds issued by Dom Miguel during the civil war. According to Borchard (1951) these bonds were quoted on the Bourse until September 1837, by which time their price had dropped from about 400 francs for a par value of 1000 francs to 120. The Paris stock exchange remained nonetheless open to new Portuguese loans. However, as bondholders' associations successfully lobbied to boycott Portuguese values, French bankers could hardly market these loans. By 1890, the boycott had pushed the Portuguese government back to the negotiation table, leading to an agreement on 1891. In 1864, French investors faced another repudiation: the Mexican government led by Juarez refused to recognize Maximilian's debt. The French government, which had largely helped to issue the loans on its markets, agreed to reimburse its nationals to the extent of approximately 50% of the invested amounts. By recognizing a moral duty to take over part of Maximilian's debt, the French government created a precedent. Besides the "moral" aspect stemming from the high profile the French government had in the bond issue, it is likely that it reimbursed part of the Mexican debts in order to minimize the impact on French bondholders' wealth. The French government position may have lead to two kind of moral hazard attitude. In the Russian case, knowing that the French government would probably back them in case of trouble, French investors may have invested more heavily in Russian values. On the other hand, if France was going to repay part of the debt, Soviets had no incentive to fulfill the Tsarist obligations 2 .
There is, to our knowledge, no study tracking the sovereign bond price evolution of a country, which breaks up. When this happens, the public debt is to be partitioned. The 1877-1878 Russian-Ottoman war led to the creation of many new countries making secession from the Ottoman Empire. The Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin (1878) discussed the allocation of the Ottoman Debt. The Treaty of Berlin recognized the principle of state succession and provided that a portion of the Ottoman debt should be assigned on an equitable basis to Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia. The Treaty of Lausanne (1924) settled the «equitable basis». At the time, specialists in international law, (Bonfils (1914) ), stated that each new country should take the interest burden in proportion to land, people or tax revenues.
The impact of war events on bond prices has been studied in different contexts. Davis and Pecquet (1990) analyze the Confederate bond price reactions during the Civil War and find a link between their evolution and the Gettysburg defeat, the fall of Vicksburg and Atlanta. For the same war, Willard, Guinnane and Rosen (1996) study the Greenback's gold price movements and find a significant link between war events and bond prices. Kucher (2000, 2001) analyze the monthly evolution of five European government bonds traded on the Swiss Bourse between 1928 and 1948. They find that some major events are not incurring any significant price change. Waldenström and Frey (2002) run the same analysis on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. They find that there are large discrepancies between events considered as major turning points nowadays by historians and events perceived as important at the time. Oosterlinck (2003) shows that there is a premium for French bonds issued before versus during the war. The breakpoints on this premium are mainly linked to political changes and reassessments regarding the legitimacy of French rulers. Brown and Burdekin (2002) isolate structural breaks and turning points on German bonds traded in London during World War II. The outbreak of WWII and the D-Day invasion appear to be major turning points. Furthermore, these authors suggest that the bond prices anticipate Hitler's overthrow and the post-war settlement of bondholders' claim.
The economic oriented literature dealing with the repudiation of the Tsarist debt focuses on macroeconomic aspects. The Russian monetary problems, stemming from the repudiation, have been studied extensively in the 1920's (Apostol and Michelson (1922) , Comité des banques russes à Paris (1921) , Raffalovitch (1922) ). More recently, Freymond (1995) has provided a financial approach about the French investors' losses and feelings. He shows that the attitude towards the repudiated bonds differs according to the countries where they were traded: ranging from a small financial involvement (pay one or two coupons and then leave the investors to their fate), to full reimbursement. For bondholders located out of Russia, international pressures and potential negotiations enter into account. However, these negotiations are hampered by the size and political influence of the repudiating country, Soviet Union being one of the main twentieth century powers.
The following study differs from the previous approaches in at least two respects. First, it uses on an original quantitative and qualitative database to determine which events investors considered, at the time, as important. Second, it aims at showing, in the light of modern financial theory, why investors kept hoping after the Soviet repudiation decree. Even after the repudiation, three potential payers remained. First, if the Bolsheviks were overthrown, a new Russian government would probably reimburse the debt. Second, newly created countries, such as Poland or the Baltic States were according to international law, responsible for part of the debt. Lastly, as the French government had some responsibility for the bonds' sale among the French public, investors could reasonably hope to see France fulfill part of the Russian obligations. The analysis seeks to determine to which extent each piece of information plays a role in the bond valuation, allowing thus to disentangle the SRP.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and addresses the market microstructure issue. Section 3 analyses potential explanations for the puzzle related to the issuing country's fate, Section 4 studies the elements specific to France, the place where the bonds are traded. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
The data series and market microstructure
The data series have been collected in the Bulletin de la Cote de la Compagnie des Agents de Change de Paris 3 on a daily basis for a period stretching from January 1, 1918 to December 31, 1919. The data consists of the daily price series, on the Paris Stock Exchange, of a Russian long-term (50 years) bond issued in 1906 4 and paying a yearly 5% coupon 5 . This bond was one of the most liquid Russian issue. Actually, it was exchanged on several markets but serial numbers were specific to a given stock exchange. Therefore, measures taken on a particular market had no effect elsewhere 6 . According to Freymond (1995) , 72% of the 1906 bonds were traded in Paris. Table 1 shows that bond prices kept an average of 56,1% of par value (this is the "dirty price" usually quoted at the time). The mean value and the median are both very high: for instance, the mean of a German bond traded on the London Stock Exchange following the outbreak of WWII remained between 0 and 20% (Brown and Burdekin (2002) ) during the war period. The minimum value (45%) is also in sharp contrast with this case. Daily returns are computed as follows: r t = (P t+1 -P t + D t )/P t , with P t the price at date t and D t , the dividend paid at date t.
In order to take into account the periods of stock exchange closure, working day returns are computed. When daily returns are available, working day returns equal daily returns. When it is not possible to compute a daily return (because the stock exchange is closed n days), a "working day" return is computed as: r t = (P t+n -P t +D t ) /P t .
3 I thank M. Gallais-Hamonno and Ms. Bodilsen for their help and availability when collecting the data respectively at the Université d'Orléans and at the SBF. 4 The 1909 Russian bond with a 4,5% coupon exhibits the same trend. 5 Due on May 1 and November 1, expressed in different currencies but based on a common gold reference. 6 The series with a number between 1 and 273 were traded in Paris (with those between 241 and 273 also exchanged in Vienna), those between 274 and 339 in London and those from 340 to 350 in Amsterdam.
These returns are used in the remaining part of the paper 7 . They are on average close to zero but on some dates can reach extreme values (see Appendix 1).
The return distribution is rather symmetric: mean and median have the same value and the skewness is equal to 0,59; thus small. Furthermore, the distribution is leptokurtic, a common feature in bond return series.
For the period under study, and according to Macmillan (2003) , in view of the troubled times, Russian news or telegrams could take days or weeks, to reach their destination. It is crucial to take this element into account in order to determine Russian news' impact. In order to deal with the potential time span, three day lagged and weekly returns are also computed and analyzed. The SRP is of course analyzed after the February 8, 1918 repudiation. It is nonetheless interesting to give an overview of the events preceding the repudiation. Therefore the data has been collected from 1917 to 1919. Figure 1 shows that, following a long declining trend, which starts with the outburst of WWI, the 1906 Russian bond, traded on the Paris Stock Exchange, begins the year 1917 at 84,4% of its par value. The price evolution reflects the abdication of Nicolas II, the April troubles and the October Revolution. The decline following the March revolution is light. In a speech dated March 31, 1917 Kerenski, Russia's new Prime Minister, expresses his intention to honor all existing debts. This can explain why the decline remained relatively small. Up to the end of 1917, the financial press exhibits contradictory feelings regarding the Russian debt. According to Freymond (1995) , the bondholders remain confident, as they either believe that the Bolshevik regime will not last for long or that the Bolsheviks cannot be as bad as depicted. Furthermore, as the Bolsheviks will need money, they will have to come back on capital markets. Therefore, they seem unlikely to repudiate the Tsarist debts.
At the end of 1917, the political situation is still extremely complex. Bolsheviks have seized power in the central part of the country, some leaders want to stop the war with Germany in order to strengthen the revolution and create a "socialist country". The SocialistRevolutionary (S-R) movement 8 , which had been part of the former government, is opposed to the Bolsheviks. Its goal is to create a legitimate democratic government, with however a leftist position. Meanwhile, the Whites hope for the restoration of the former Russian Empire.
In 1918, the series starts at 55% of par value (figure 1), it declines from January to the beginning of February 1918. After a short but strong rise, the series exhibits a downward trend reaching a minimum during April-May 1918. From May to August, the Russian values follow a bullish trend. From September to December 1918 the bond value remains close to 65%, with however one notable decline end October-begin November. From December 1918 to April 1919 the market is bearish, except for a short-lived positive effect in February. End April, the series experiences an upward trend until May. From May to November, prices remain relatively stable and decline afterwards.
Especially for very troubled periods, it is highly required to determine to which extent the observed prices correspond to real trades. Information on this matter has been collected in the contemporaneous press and the Bulletin de la Cote de la Compagnie des Agents de Change de Paris. From 1917 to 1919 , the Russian section of the Paris Stock Exchange experiences some periods of very low activity. Unfortunately, no archive mentions the daily volumes. The Bulletin de la Cote de la Compagnie des Agents de Change de Paris gives the number of price changes, which provides an indication of the market activity. For the studied bond, there is, most of the time, more than one change a day, implying that several trades took place. However, the volume of these trades is unknown, thus numbers of trades must be taken with caution. The French financial press also records the periods of total inactivity, for which there is no quotation. For example, on December 12, 1917, Le Rentier describes the Russian bonds market as "non existing as the sell orders do not find a counterpart" 9 . During the following month the market is extremely narrow and it is impossible to exchange large quantities of bonds 10 . In September, the Russian values market, which had been virtually inexistent for several months, experiences a renewed activity 11 . In January 1919 however, the trade in Russian values almost disappears from the market. There is a quotation but it is almost impossible to buy or sell any bond. This inactivity continues up to March 1919 12 . End April the number of daily quotations exhibits an upward trend, until August. In its August 27, 1919 issue, the Rentier's journalists believe that the quoted prices are mainly buy prices for capitalists ready to take a substantial risk and expecting Russia to recover from its current situation. In September, the Paris market for Russian values seems deserted 13 . During October, they experience a renewed activity that stops after November 1919. 
Does the SRP explanation lie in Russia…
The SRP stems from two major stylized facts: after the repudiation and up to December 1919, the 1906 bond price never falls below 45% of par value and in 1919 it experiences a large increase. This section describes first the different Russian actors' position towards the debt recognition, then the newly created countries and ends with the description of the military evolution during the civil war. In each case, a historical presentation is provided, then, their impact on the bond prices is analyzed.
Graph 2 and 3 relate the bond price evolution during 1918 and 1919 to the events, linked to Russia, which have the main impact on the bonds.
Russian Governments and debt repudiation: historical presentation
During the Russian civil war, many new political actors arose 14 . Ex post, most of them had a short-lived influence on Russian politics. However, ex ante and especially for foreign investors, it was uneasy to determine who would become or remain important. Therefore, any statement regarding the debt made by a potential future leader could have an impact on the Russian bond prices. Appendix 2 gives an overview of the various declarations made with regard to the debt repayment and their impact on the bond prices. 15 , at the London Stock Exchange: "Russian bonds were an outstanding feature of weakness owing to the reported drastic action of the Bolsheviks against foreign creditors (…). The Petrograd message announcing that the Superior Council of National Property have drafted a decree declaring null and void all national bonds issued by the Imperial and Bourgeois Government, (…) which is held by foreigners, naturally had a bad effect on Russian bonds." However, in its January 17, 1918 issue, the Financial Times' journalist feels that "Russian bonds, the market for which was still weak, though from the extent of the fall in prices it was evident that the proposal of the present administration to repudiate foreign loans is not taken seriously as would be the case if the Government were considered a stable one". The French investors have the same feeling towards the Soviet coup, and believe that the future Russian government will eventually take measures in order to service its debt 16 .
A few days after the repudiation, Western countries, represented by the US Ambassador, M. Francis, express their protest and declare the repudiation decree null and void. The French and British governments issue a note in similar terms. This position is repeated regularly. For example, in a letter dated, October 23, 1918 17 , the French Minister of Foreign Affairs declares that "the future Russian government will be recognized only if it takes over the obligations from its predecessor". On May 30, 1919, the French Finance Minister reaffirms that "We cannot accept as a right the repudiation of its debt by any country (…) otherwise no country in the world would be able to issue an international debt if a simple change in the government could annihilate the liabilities taken by the Nation". All the democratic countries follow the French position.
During the two yeas following the revolution, the Bolsheviks faced a strong military opposition. They never fully recognized the former debt but kept an ambiguous position using debt recognition as one of their favorites peace negotiating tool. For example, on March 27, 1918, an article published in Novaya Zizhn, Gorky's journal, stresses the needs to suppress the repudiation decree. In December 1918, Maxim Litvinov, representing the Soviet government, in an interview with the London Daily Mirror, suggests exchanging economic concessions for a moratorium on Russia's war debts (Thompson (1966) ). On January 16, 1919, the Soviet government wishes to discuss the Russian foreign debt. President Wilson makes this statement public on January 20, 1919. The following day, Soviets seem willing to repay part of the repudiated debt, and on February 4, 1919, to recognize the debt. During the Paris Peace conferences, the Soviet government suggests that it is "ready to do much for the sake of peace, whether that meant paying at least part of the repudiated foreign debt or granting news concessions to foreign enterprises" (Macmillan (2003)). On February 14, 1919, L. Nadeau, representing the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, meets Lenin himself, who considers using part of the Russian natural resources to reimburse the bondholders. On November 19, 1919, Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, offers to pay Russia's debt. But onconsidered seriously repaying the Tsarist debt. However, at the time, these changing signals could impact the bond prices.
Contrasting with the Bolshevik position, the various counter-governments appearing in Russia recognize the debt. In July 1918, the Socialist Revolutionaries create a government in Samara 19 , named Komoutch, whereas the Siberian Government Council rules the Vladivostok region. In order to get an allied military support both express their will to repay the Tsarist debt. The same holds for, the Omsk 20 and Ufa regime 21 born during October 1918 (Comité des représentants des banques russes à Paris (1921) ). On November 18, 1918, supported by Great-Britain, Admiral Kolchak overthrows the Ufa government. Three days later, he declares he will take over the debt burden. On June 9, 1919, Kolchak reaffirms his previous acknowledgment of Russia's debts. Similar statements follow on a regular basis. For example the "Minister of Finance" working for the generals fighting in the Southern part of the country recognizes the debt. In France, Arthur Raffalovitch proposes a practical proposal to restart the debt service. However, after the Versailles Treaty, even the supporters of the Tsarist regime refuse to recognize the whole-borrowed amount because Russia has not been invited to negotiate the war's end. The various treaties are viewed as unfair to the White Russians who consider their country but partially responsible of its debt 22 . Notwithstanding this position, on October 22, 1919, a British-American consortium issues a short-term loan to the Omsk government worth $ 40 000 000, backed by gold deposited in Hong-Kong 23 .
Russian Governments and the debt repudiation: Impact on the bond prices
Bonds prices do not react to statements coming from Russia on the day of their issuance. The 1906 Russian bond price exhibits a strong decline following the decree proposal and following the first repudiation rumors, the bond price drops from 56% to 50,75% in a few days. For January 13, 1918 the weekly return is equal to -8,89%. The daily return on February 8, 1918 (day of the publication of the official repudiation decree) is null suggesting that the repudiation impact had already been fully incorporated.
The first statements inducing the feeling that the debt could be repaid have a clear impact on bond prices: both the debt recognition proposal issued in Novaya Zizhn on March 27, 1918 and the Soviet proposal, in December 1918, to discuss the debt issue lead to high weekly returns (respectively 3,19% and 9,17%). However, afterwards, the Bolsheviks supposedly changing opinions regarding the debt treatment have almost no more effect on the bond prices. This limited impact is confirmed by The Economist on February 15, 1919: "Russian were also rather stronger under the influence of the new attitude of the Soviets towards the Russian debt, rising by between 75 centimes and one franc", reflecting investors disbelief of Soviet statements.
The Allied countries' reactions regarding the illegality of the debt repudiation hardly affect the bond prices. For instance, the Allied protests happening on February 13, 1918 , October 23, 1918 or May 30, 1919 are not reflected. Two reasons can explain this fact. First, these statements are seldom linked with military operations. Second, and most likely, investors had anticipated them. Repudiations represent such an extreme position, that obviously no government could support the Bolshevik view. Thus, as soon as the repudiation was issued, investors expected their leaders to fight this position. Therefore, the prices do not move at the announcement date. The same is probably true for the anti-Bolshevik governments' position regarding the repudiation. Following Kolchak's debt recognition, on November 21, 1918 bond prices increase with but 1,59%. Even if prices are particularly high during October and November 1918, the bonds do not exhibit a strong reaction to the announcement of the Tsarist debt recognition. When Kolchak reaffirms his acknowledgment of Russia's debt in June 1919 the bond price declines, confirming that the bond already incorporated the recognition in November 1918. The negative return shows that prices react to other but simultaneous events, such as White Armies military drawbacks.
Statements regarding the Russian debt recognition have thus an overall surprisingly limited impact on bond prices. Even though the repudiation decree clearly influences the investors' expectations, it brings but a moderate price decrease at its issuance. If a larger window is examined, to take into account the repudiation rumors, this conclusion remains valid. Following the repudiation, the price declines but certainly not as extremely as theoretically expected. The Bolshevik proposal to reimburse the debt has only an impact when first stated. Afterwards as no concrete measures are taken, investors stop believing the Soviets. Statements made on the Allied side or by the White Armies go almost unnoticed on the bond market. Investors seem certain, on the day of the repudiation self, that all the involved parties would condemn the Soviet position. Therefore, bond prices do not react to debt reimbursement options offered by White generals or considered by the Allied as they already incorporate them. the creation of new countries will make reimbursement more difficult for Western investors as it is harder to reach an agreement with many small countries than just with one large. The author suggests that "by helping the small countries to exist, we could gain their friendship for the future" 29 . Just before the end of WWI, and in view of the jurisprudence, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, reaffirms this position 30 . His government is thus ready to consider that Russia is but responsible for part of its debt 31 and supports the creation of an international organization in order to determine the amounts due by each country. Once countries are recognized, investors very soon realize that they are not willing to pay. Ironically enough, in the beginning of the 1920's the Bolshevik government, representing Russia declares that these countries have no obligation regarding the Tsarist debt.
The creation of new countries and the secession of territories: historical presentation
In 1917, the Russian Imperial authorities, most Bolshevik movements and the White movements consider that Ukraine belongs to Russia. The Ukrainians themselves do not share this view. Even if their nationalist movements have very different political orientations, there is a consensus on Ukraine's boundaries (Von Hagen (1997) ). Furthermore, the AustroHungarian Empire, the German Empire, and Poland support the creation of an independent Ukraine to prevent them from a Russian aggression. Following the February revolution, the Ukrainian nationalists create a council named Rada. The October revolution gives them the opportunity to declare their independence, further recognized by the French government on January 3, 1918 3, (Duroselle (1994 ) and by the Brest Litovsk Treaty. The newborn country falls very quickly under the German and Austrian sphere of influence 32 .
To our knowledge, the Ukrainian government is the only one, in the 1920's, to recognize its responsibility for part of the Russian debt 33 , probably with the hope to get British or French military support. The creation of an independent Ukraine fuels the investors' hope to get at least partially, reimbursed. On September 26, 1918, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers promises an advance on the Tsarist coupons for the bonds held in Ukrainian banks before November 3, 1918. In its September 29, 1918, issue, Finances et économies populaires reports this news under the title "The Tsarists bonds are recognized" 34 . Strategically, Ukrainian rulers reaffirm very often their intention to repay 35 but the bondholders never received anything. End 1918, Ukraine comes back under Soviet control.
The creation of new countries and the secession of territories: Impact on the bond prices
During the period under study, statements regarding the new countries recognition made either by French politicians or by the French press have almost no impact on the, reimbursement perception. Nevertheless, following the Ukrainian September 26, 1918, declaration the bond prices exhibit a sharp rise (with a 5,31% daily return). However, the 29 A view shared by the French press, see for example La gazette du commerce et de l'industrie July 13, 1918. 30 Letter from Stephen Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the president of the Office National des Valeurs mobilières, October 23, 1918, ANPFVM 440-A-10. 31 Letter from the Président du Conseil 31 (Prime Minister) with instruction to M. Martel, France's representative by the South Russian government, November 6, 1920, ANPFVM, 440A-10. 32 As stated in many documents see ANPFVM, 440-A-14. 33 Rumania would agree, in 1934, to repay part of the Akerman railway bonds which had helped develop the railway industry in Bessarabia, a province reattached to Rumania after WWI (Freymond (1995) ). 34 On reconnaît les emprunts du Tsar. 35 For example, in a letter, dated June 22, 1920, Earl Tyszkiewicz, president of the Ukrainian delegation recognizes Ukrainian responsibility for 30% of the former Russian debt.
latter cannot be attributed for sure to this news, as on the same day the WWI's Allied final offensive begins.
As a whole, news related to the creation of countries has minor effects on the bond prices. Two factors can explain this: first, most of the countries are created after the studied period (or at its very end), second there are few changes in political positions thus few investors' reactions. Notwithstanding, the possibility that a least one new country would assume part of the debt burden could partly explain why prices remain high up to end 1919.
The Civil War, the German and the Allied actions in Russia: historical presentation 36 The two years following the October Revolution are, on the military point of view, extremely confused. Three main military forces fight the Soviets: Germany (as a continuation of WWI), White Russians and Allied troops. This section describes first the German operations, then the Allied interventions and lastly the White armies' actions directed against Soviet troops. Appendices 3 and 4 summarize the main military events occurring during 1918 and 1919 as well as their expected and real impact on the bond prices.
After the October events, revolutionary leaders express different views regarding the war 37 . Peace negotiations with Germany start nonetheless in December 1917. The Soviets plead for a peace without territorial changes. According to Avenel (2001) the negotiations involve a first meeting on January 17, 1918, followed by a German ultimatum. In view of the Soviet refusal, a German offensive starts a month later resulting in the invasion of a large part of Ukraine, Livonia and Estonia. On February 20, 1918, the Germans move towards Reval, Petrograd, Moscow and Kiev, meeting little resistance, and occupy Hapsal and Minsk. On March 3, 1918, after these military drawbacks, the Soviet government signs the Brest Litovsk peace treaty. As a result, Russia loses Riga, Byelorussia, Courland and Lithuania whose fate is to be determined by their population. Furthermore, the treaty acknowledges the German control over Livonia and Estonia until national institutions are created and Russia is forced to conclude peace with Ukraine and Finland.
In the Allies' eyes, if the Bolsheviks were overthrown, Russia would again fight against Germany. Therefore, in the spring of 1918, British troops land in Northern Russia. In Siberia, the Japanese army and the Czechoslovakian Legion 38 are opposed to the Bolsheviks. With the hope to get Allied support to create an independent Czech state after WWI, the Czech legion decides, on May 25, 1918 36 The following section is mainly based on Avenel (2001), Footman (1961 ), Gleichen (1988 ), Mawdsley (1997 , Pipes (1990) and Salomoni (1997) . 37 Whereas some, as Lenin, claimed that their participation to the war should be stopped in order to consolidate the revolution, others like Boukharin believed that the war could lead to a world revolution. Trotsky was in favor of a "wait and see" attitude as he expected revolutions to start in Austria and Germany. 38 Freed by the Brest Litovsk Treaty, this legion was composed of Czechs prisoner who had refused to fight for the Austro-Hungary Empire. Foreign interventions represent but a part of the military offensives against the Soviets. Very soon Russian opposition to the Soviets emerge. As underlined by Mawdsley (1997), "The early centers of resistance were (…) places with a particular national or territorial identity or with conservative characteristics where the internal seizure of Soviet power did not apply". Two main fronts emerge during the civil war, the first one located in Southern Russia 40 , the second one in Siberia 41 .
In Southern Russia, a few days after the October revolution, the Russian Volunteer Army is created. The parties involved in this creation are opposed to the Soviets but have different goals. The White generals wish to recreate the Russian Empire as before WWI while the Cossacks hope to get a broad autonomy in a federated Russia. The Bolsheviks benefit from these discrepancies and accumulate military successes during the 1917-1918 winter. On February 11, 1918, the Bolsheviks conquer Rostov. From March to April, the White Armies retake the lost territories. According to Gleichen (1988) 44 " and "the improved news from Russia, and the belief that Bolshevism is on the verge to collapse, has brought about improvement in Russian securities 45 ". In September the same year, heavy falls that occurred in Russian Government, Municipal and Railway issues are attributed to the announcement that British Forces were withdrawing from North Russia 46 . In its November 1, 1919 issue, The Economist believes that "Russian government stocks have shown appreciable rises on the strength of optimistic reports from the Petrograd front in regard to the prospects of Yudenich's forces". A week later however, Russian values are "heavier owing to the stoppage of Yudenich's offensive 47 ". The importance of the civil war on the Russian section is further assessed by the fact that high volume and periods of renewed activity usually match White military successes.
The bond prices hardly react immediately to all the major battles held on Russian soil. Several factors may explain this result. Even nowadays, it is hard to draw a clear picture of all protagonists' fate during the Russian civil war. At the time interpreting war news was even harder. Furthermore, a reaction can arise only if the news properly reached France, an element, which may be questioned. As stated by Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister: 43 Formerly Saint Petersburg later named Leningrad, nowadays Saint Petersburg. 44 The Economist, May 3, 1919. 45 The Economist, May 10, 1919. 46 The Economist, September 20, 1919. 47 The Economist, November 8, 1919. "We were in fact never dealing with ascertained or perhaps, even ascertainable facts. Russia was a jungle in which no one could say what was within a few yards of him 48 " Eventually, news considered unimportant today may have been interpreted as major at the time. In order to take this element into account, the study refers often to the press of the time and to Gleichen (1988) , which gives a contemporary report of war news.
Up to the end of WWI, six military events seem related to an extreme daily return: the peace negotiations between German and Soviets on January 17, 1918 (-3,77%), the adoption of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by the German Reichstag (-5,10%), the counter revolution rumors of April 30, 1918 (8,70%) , the proclamation of the Siberian Government Council, on July 23, 1918 (3,60%), the arrival of French troops in Northern Russia, on July 26, 1918 (3,42%) and the Czech Legion defeat on the Volga on September, 20, 1918 (-3,14% If one takes into account a 3 days time lag for news to reach France, results remain almost the same. Up to July 1919, and with the exception of events happening during July 1918, if news have an impact on the three days lagged returns they are also reflected on the daily returns. After July 1919, it seems that news take more time to reach Paris. The occupation of Perm (July 1, 1919), Denikin's advance to Orel (October 14, 1919) and the Anti-Kolchak revolt in Irkutsk (December 24, 1919), exhibit respectively a -5,69%, 7,96% and -5,94% 3 days lagged return. The 7 days lagged returns do not allow to determine additional events, exception made for July 1918. For this specific month, extreme returns are observed for July 16-17, 21, 23, 25 and 26 1918. Results must however been taken with caution as some of them are very counterintuitive. For example, bonds exhibit a puzzling strong positive reaction following the death of the Tsar Nicholas II 49 . Another surprising result is observed on December 24, 1918. The very negative daily return (-5,08%) coincides with Perms' conquest by Kolchak, an event that this could hardly be perceived as a bad omen for the future. Furthermore, supposedly important events such as Czech revolt on May 25, 1918, the Allied intervention in Vladivostok on August 3, 1918 or Kazan's conquest on August 6, 1918 have almost no impact. Several elements can provide an explanation. First, reactions may be unobservable because simultaneous important events took place on the Western front. This explanations fits well for the execution of Tsar Nicholas II and the absence of reaction following the Czech revolt 50 . Microstructure effects can also play a role, the Tsar death and Kolchak victory in Perm happen while the Russian section is very quiet. Eventually, some unexpected results remain unexplained. Thus, even for the "identified" events a doubt remains as to the accurateness of the suggested explanation. 48 Quoted by Macmillan (2003) . 49 This either suggests that in French bondholders' eyes, the Tsar could but have a minor role regarding the debt repayment or that other events cancelled the Tsar death's effect. The three days and one week extremely high positive returns favor the latest explanation. 50 The Tsar's death coincides with very successful French offensives on the Western front and a positive reaction to the Czech revolt may have been fully offset by the news of the third German spring offensive on May, 27, 1918. As a conclusion, identifying the impact of precise events is in the Russian case extremely hard as news are delayed and many events happen simultaneously. Nonetheless, during 1918, the three kinds of news (i.e. related to repudiation, civil war and the numerous secessions) play at some point an important role. However, some seemingly important events have no impact on the bond prices. This suggests that, other potentially more important news interfere. For 1919, only military events are clearly reflected in the bond prices. They explain most of the extreme price changes for that year and therefore offer the most likely explanation to the puzzle. As a whole, amongst events happening in Russia, news from the civil war seem the most important.
… or does the explanation lie abroad?
The bond prices under study come from the Paris Stock Exchange. Thus, news threatening France's future can have an impact on all traded values. Indeed, if the German were to take over Paris, the bondholders would probably need cash if they wanted to leave an occupied city. Thus, any news changing the anticipations regarding the capital city's fate are included in the bond prices. Second, regarding the Russian bonds themselves if the holders were expecting France to act as a lender of last resort then a German victory would be catastrophic. As France would then probably have to pay reparations, its government would revise its position regarding the Russian bonds. This section describes first the different military operations and peace negotiations held on French soil, then the French government's attitude towards the repudiated debt and ends with the description of the bondholders' associations actions. The impact of these elements on the bond prices is subsequently analyzed.
Graph 4 puts the bond price evolution during 1918 in perspective with the events, happening out of Russia, which have the main impact on the bonds. Article 116 of the future Versailles Treaty, adopted by the council of Four 51 , on May 3, 1919, provides three things: "first, Germany was required to recognise the independence of all territories that had been part of the pre-war Russian Empire; second, the Brest Litovsk Treaty and all related and associated treaties were abrogated; third, the Allied and associated powers reserved Russia's right to obtain reparations from Germany" (Thompson (1966) ). The last part article 116 thus opens the way for reparations if the former Russian government was restored. On June 28, 1919, German representatives sign the Versailles Treaty, thus putting an end on WWI.
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World War I and its aftermath: Impact on bond prices
The bond prices clearly react to WWI events taking place on French soil. Some extreme returns are due to the first German spring offensive (March 21 and 23, 1918) , the September 25, 1918 surprise attack and the beginning of the final Franco-American offensive on September 26, 1918. However, some important events are not reflected. For instance, on the day of the third German spring offensive, the bond exhibit a negative but moderate return (-1,01%), while in view of the military implications of this attack, a stronger decline could have been expected 52 . Globally, the bond price follows a trend related to war events suggesting a progressive integration of the news. For example, from June 3, 1918 till August 2, 1918, the Russian bond prices exhibit an upward trend, which is linked to the everincreasing anticipated arrival of American troops on French soil and to the July French victory.
Peace negotiations also play a role in the bond evaluation. The Rethondes meeting and the integration of Article 116 in the Versailles Treaty, provoke extreme returns. The impact of the latter must be stressed. Indeed, it opens the way for Russians to use German wealth to repay part of the debt. It seems that, at the time, the German alternative was seriously considered. The financial press 53 stresses the importance of the Paris peace negotiations on the Russian section of the London Stock Exchange: "Russians were in some speculative favour (…) owing to the impression that the Peace conference will make an early start upon the re-settlement of affairs in Russia", also holding for the Paris bourse: "the Russian funds have been uncertain, owing to the attitude which is to be adopted by the Peace conference as to the Russian problem" 54 . As rumors regarding the repudiation gain in intensity, the French government guarantees the payment of the January 1918 coupon 56 . It stresses, however, that this payment can by no means be interpreted as debt recognition, a statement not credible to many investors. On January 31, 1918, M. Klotz, the French Finance Minister, declares that the government will pay the February coupons 57 . Again, he insists on the measures' temporary nature, as discussions are held in order to achieve a common allied policy. Meanwhile, many voices claim that France has a "moral duty" regarding the reimbursement 58 national turmoil created by the repudiation, the French government has, up to the end of WWI, an incentive to fulfill Russia's obligations to keep its financial influence in Russia.
The national reactions: historical presentation
Officially, the coupons payments are made to support an allied country facing momentary internal problems. Thus, as a result of the Brest Litovsk Treaty, France stops servicing the Russian debt as it refuses to help a country which has now signed a separate peace with Germany 59 . In reaction, part of the French financial press exhorts the investors to firmly protest 60 . During August, many believe that the French parliament will change its decision and pay the second semester coupons 61 . On September 19, 1918 the government votes a law allowing French investors to subscribe up to 50% of the new French Liberation loan by paying with the Russian coupons due from April to December 1918 62 . This coupon exchange is the last action undertaken by the French government. Notwithstanding, as late as May 30 th 1919, in a speech at the Senate, the French Finance Minister suggests, to reiterate the September 1918 operation; a proposal eventually rejected by the rest of the government approval.
French bondholders do not rely solely on their government. Very quickly, numerous bondholders' association are created. On August 5, 1918 a Commission générale pour la protection des intérêts français en Russie is born, followed on September 28, 1918 by the 5, 1919 . In the meantime, unscrupulous individuals set up fake associations in order to steel money from credulous investors. End august 1918, and following several scandals, financial journals warn investors. The official associations' action consists mainly in collecting relevant information and lobbying in order to get reimbursed by the French government 63 . Eventually, bondholders hope, if the government's action is unsuccessful, to gain something when Russia will come back on the French market. The threat of no access to foreign capital markets and a boycott of Russian values is seriously considered, since following the 1837 Portuguese repudiation the boycott had proved successful.
Comité de Défense des porteurs de Fonds d'Etat russes, de valeurs garanties par l'Etat russe et d'emprunts municipaux, and by the Comité de Défense des porteurs français de valeurs industrielles et bancaires russes on April
Abroad, national reactions differ widely. As a consequence of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Soviets recognize the bonds held by German nationals 64 . An additional convention, dated August 27, 1918 guarantees the transfer of gold, for the payment of the coupons and the amortized bonds on October 14, 1918. In September 1918, the Austrian government tries unsuccessfully to obtain the same agreement 65 . In view of the economic crises created by the suspension of the coupon service, most countries propose partial 59 On January 27, 1918, the British government had agreed, to give British 12 years bonds in exchange of Russian Treasury Bills amounting at the time 10 000 000£. 60 Le Rentier, February 27, 1918 and May 27, 1918 . 61 Le Rentier, August 27, 1918 This idea is already mentioned in the September 14, 1918 issue of the Revue des Valeurs Russes. At the time, it competes with another proposition: a general buyback of the Russian values by the French government, which as sole remaining bondholder, would then have to convince the Soviet to repay. The total amount subscribed through this way reaches 265 millions (Le Rentier, June 17, 1919) . 63 ANPFVM 440-A-10. 64 In view of this, the French government fears that its citizens will sell their industrial values at a low price to Germans, which can get a full value for them. In a letter to M. Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs dated May 10 th 1918, the French ambassador in Sweden, M. Thiébaut, describes this practice and stresses the need to take counter-measures. ANPFVM 440A-10-24. 65 Messager de Paris, September 12, 1918. settlements. The Italian, British and US governments exchange Russian bonds with, respectively, Italian state bonds (for approximately 50% of par value), British and American Treasury Bills). The best outcome remains for the Japanese, who suffer no losses as their government buys back the Russian bonds held by its nationals (Freymond (1995) .
The national reactions: impact on bond prices
In Paris, extreme returns follow from the actions undertaken by the British and French governments to service the Russian debt during January 1918. Depending on the country, the same bonds exhibit different prices because of the government's attitude towards the debt. Eventually, expectations regarding the home government's attitude play a major role. Nevertheless, the creation of bondholders association has a minor impact.
In January 1918, the British government takes "protective measures with Russian Treasury and commercial paper" which according to the British press 66 "served to emphasize the feeling of mistrust (…) Consequently Russian bonds were again quoted substantially lower". This phenomenon is not observed in France. Indeed, during the days following the bond prices continue to drop on the London Stock exchange whereas they recover in Paris. The Financial Times 67 stresses the importance of "the alleged confiscatory policy adopted by the Bolsheviks in regard to British owned mines (…) which accentuated the feeling of distrust entertained by holders of Russian securities". On the Paris Stock Exchange, the bond prices rise strongly end January 1918 as both France and Great-Britain guarantee the January coupon. On March 13, 1918, in London, the Russian bonds price increase. According to the Financial Times, they were favorably influenced by the government's announcement that the coupons due on March 1, on the 5% loan of 1822 are being paid or "by consideration of the advantage likely to accrue from the formation of the powerful committee of issuing bourses". The following day, the Russian bonds traded in Paris also exhibit an upward trend. French investors probably consider that their government will follow the British measures, as suggested in a note dated March 15, 1918 68 . End March 1918, the London Stock Exchange reacts to the "Allied disclaimer of responsibility for any further provision of funds to meet coupon payment" 69 . The price drop experienced in London is not reflected on the Paris Bourse. After January 1918, national governments' attitudes do not induce extreme returns. The price declines when the Soviets agree to transfer gold to pay the German bondholders. According to the Financial Times, "Russians (values) were favorably influenced by the report that the Bolshevik government had sent a note to Turkey declaring the Brest-Litovsk Treaty null and void". On the French market, this news has a very limited impact if any.
During 1919, the French government makes few statements regarding the debt but the price remain relatively high. This is perhaps a consequence of example of the so-called peso problem hypothesis 70 . This hypothesis states stems from the fact that investors believe in, and hope, to see an event happen, which in fact never materializes and is thus unobservable. This expected event need not be highly unlikely. In fact, investors make rational expectations and consider the probability and the potential impact of the event. In the Russian case, investors probably hoped a takeover of the debt by the French government; an element that never happened. This is probably the most likely explanation for the first puzzle, namely the persistent relatively high value of bonds up to end 1919. Of course, part of the puzzle itself could be, for some low activity periods, an illusion due to a microstructure effect.
World War I events are clearly reflected on the bond prices, whereas the bondholders actions have but a very minor impact. The French and British involvement regarding the bond repayment play a direct major role in January 1918 but not anymore afterwards. For 1919, only one event, the inclusion of Article 116 in the Versailles Treaty, plays a major role. Up to the end of WWI, news of the French front has the biggest impact.
Conclusion
The SRP consists of two main issues: first, the limited price decline following the repudiation announcement, second, the relatively high price observed for the two following years. The paper analyzes to which events bond prices react. Up to WW1's end, news from the French front explains an important part of major value changes. Afterwards, news from the Russian civil war has the most dramatic impact. Statements regarding the repudiation, debt recognition by newly created countries, the French government's attitude towards reimbursement and bondholders' actions play also a role, although less preeminent. Furthermore, microstructure effects probably also allow understanding part of the puzzle's stylized facts.
The Soviet repudiation problematic gives an insight on actual issues regarding sovereign debts. The analysis emphasizes the importance of statements' credibility. Soviets first proposals to recognize the debt are reflected in bond prices. However as no concrete actions back these allegations, investors stop trusting the Soviet announcements, which very soon do not lead to anymore price changes. Furthermore, the paper confirms the results of previous studies showing the impact of war events on national bond prices. It further builds on these results. Indeed, the paper shows that in some cases military events concerning the country where the bonds are traded have a bigger impact than war events taking place in the issuing country. This suggests that bond prices can highly differ depending on the stock exchange's location. Another element strengthens this argument: depending on the stock exchange, national governments took very different measures regarding the same debt. Whereas Japanese got fully repaid, French bondholders received a minimal payment from their government.
Two important particularities need to be stressed here: first, as serial numbers were attached to a specific stock exchange, there was no geographic arbitrage opportunity between bourses; second these reimbursements were most of time made for citizens of the reimbursing country only. Thus, not only the location of the stock exchange plays a role but the investors' nationality. The Soviet case is a good example of creditors' "grab race", with German bondholders being the only ones fully reimbursed. The "grab race" issue remains and, nowadays, most workout proposals for sovereign debtors suggest avoiding creditors acting on their own in order to avoid free-riding 71 .
Recently, Eichengreen and Portes (1995) have recommended to recreate 72 bondholders' representative committees which would "minimize uncertainty about the locus of authority in negotiations". Even though the analysis shows that the creation of bondholders' associations are not reflected on bond prices, their suggestion is appealing. The absence of reaction in the Russian case does by no mean imply that bondholders' committees were useless. As a matter of fact, the lobbying action of l'Association française des porteurs de valeurs mobilières probably induced the payment of the first Russian coupons by the French government. Thus, results obtained in the Russian case also have implications for today's policy towards sovereign debts. Nowadays, supranational organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank help settling sovereign debt defaults. Nonetheless, there is still no consensus on the measures to be taken. In this respect, financial history provides a valuable contribution to the debate as it allows, among others, former policies' impact.
Further research could be conducted to determine to which extent the risk of country break-up is integrated in bond prices. In this respect, the former Yugoslavian debt could provide an interesting case. Another extension of this paper could compare the Russian bond price evolution on basis of a benchmark, such as a French national bond in order to determine whether French military events affect the market as a whole. Eventually, the importance of the trade location could be tested by analyzing the price differentials between Russian bonds traded in Paris and London. This price differential would reflect investors perception of their government's willingness to support the defaulting country and possibly their expected bargaining power to reach a settlement. Modern sovereign debts issued by countries perceived as very risky, could exhibit different prices depending on the place were they are traded. Thus, even though the IMF aims at securing global settlement in case of default, international relations can play an important role with regard to the financial support given by a specific country. In this framework, the credibility of the potential retaliations (economic as well as armed interventions) must be stressed.
In a sense, the Soviet repudiation offers a unique example of a multidimensional peso problem, for which several events of different nature have at some point a non-negligible likelihood to become reality. These positive events are numerous and include: the Soviet overthrow, a Soviet withdrawal of the repudiation decree, a foreign partial reimbursement (by a newly created country for example) or a reimbursement by the French authorities. Investors' rationality should thus not be questioned: prices integrate the fact that ex ante it is reasonable to assume that at least one of these events will happen. Notably, the French payment of the January coupon raises the question of what would have happened had the Bolsheviks not signed the Brest Litovsk Treaty.
Historians have the opportunity to study a specific problem in a large time window. In fact, if one extend the analysis up to today, one of these expected events eventually took place even if the first years following WWI and WWII did not look promising. Indeed, as a consequence of WWII, the number of repudiated bonds increased dramatically as many countries fell under the Soviet sphere of influence and mimicked the Soviet position. Russian bonds remained traded on the Paris stock exchange up to the 1990's with, however, an almost insignificant volume of transactions. Nonetheless, hope never completely disappeared. Freymond (1995) 79 Events have been chosen with regard to the bond prices problematic, the selection is mainly based on Avenel (2001), Footman (1961 ), Gleichen (1988 ), Mawdsley (1997 and Salomoni (1997) . Appendix 3 is thus not exhaustive. 80 We consider the Anti-Bolshevik side, thus the fall of the city means a Bolshevik success. 
